Jihad Nasr: The infrastructure empire inside Iran’s state economy
From water transfers and housing to nuclear-linked construction, the rise of a network shaped by state patronage and reformist-era politics
For more than four decades, a single name has appeared across a vast and unlikely portfolio of projects linked to the Islamic Republic: water-transfer and land-restoration schemes, energy projects, alleged cooperation in drone components, constructions at nuclear sites, grain silos in Syria, a slaughterhouse in Ethiopia, and villas in South Africa.
That name is Jihad Nasr – a sprawling network that, like the IRGC’s engineering giant Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters behind major civil and military projects, has extended its reach deep into Iran’s infrastructure economy.
Tracing Jihad Nasr’s rise points to a less-discussed driver of that expansion: politicians and managers associated with the Islamic Republic’s reformist camp. Jihad Nasr affiliates, meanwhile, present the group on their website as a private-sector enterprise made up of the “most devoted servants of God.”
The group’s origins date back roughly forty years, when the Mostazafan Foundation – a powerful state-linked conglomerate and charity – helped plant its early institutional roots. But Jihad Nasr’s emergence accelerated under President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, and it was further strengthened during successive reformist administrations. Even President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, despite empowering Khatam al-Anbiya as a counterweight, did not succeed in pushing Jihad Nasr out of the field.
Jihad Nasr’s footprint is especially pronounced in Iran’s core water and soil portfolio: hundreds of dams, and many of the country’s most consequential water-transfer projects over the past three decades. It has also worked in partnership with the IRGC, including on water-transfer projects managed by Amir Ali Hajizadeh, the former commander of the Guards’ Aerospace Force.
Over that period, trillions of rials in public funds flowed into the group’s projects—investments whose consequences, by 2025, have come into sharp focus. Iran’s water crisis has deepened to the point where even supplying the capital is becoming difficult, a trajectory shaped in part by Jihad Nasr’s work.
Take Khuzestan and sugarcane: Jihad Nasr has built or expanded most sugarcane factories and related downstream operations, and has been involved in the dams and water-transfer systems that supply those farms.
Sugarcane cultivation in the province consumes close to 4 billion cubic meters of water a year – roughly equivalent to the annual water needs of more than 50 million people. By comparison, total annual urban water consumption in the capital is no more than 1.2 billion cubic meters.
Investigation by Iran International shows that Jihad Nasr expanded from four companies in the 1980s to at least 170 by 2025, and – based on available data – has carried out at least 1,500 projects.
Those projects span mega-schemes such as land restoration in Khuzestan and Ilam (with multiple dams and long stretches of water-transfer lines embedded under a single umbrella) to urban construction including the new city of Hashtgerd near Tehran, Mehr Housing developments, and metro projects in Tehran and other cities.
The group’s political insulation has been such that it also received a share in the Islamic Republic’s confidential 25-year agreement with China.
Yet despite its reach, Jihad Nasr has remained largely absent from the official press.
The few parliamentary attempts to investigate it were repeatedly suspended – each time, according to the reporting, with the intervention of Mahmoud Hojjati, a minister under Presidents Mohammad Khatami and Hassan Rouhani.
Jihad Nasr, in this telling, is something like the reformists’ answer to Khatam al-Anbiya: a rival power center in the state’s contracting economy whose profile has long been overshadowed by the IRGC’s better-known engineering arm. And in some cases, even Khatam al-Anbiya has turned to Jihad Nasr – such as to supply pipes required for water-transfer schemes.
Empire born of the state: From wartime engineers to government contractor
In 1985, the Mostazafan Foundation established three entities – Jihad Nasr, Jihad Esteghlal and Development Jihad – and handed their management to engineering battalions from the eight-year Iran-Iraq war.
In 1997, control of the network was transferred to the Ministry of Jihad for Construction – a government body later dissolved in 2000 and merged into the Ministry of Agriculture – after which Jihad Nasr’s activities expanded until roughly a decade ago, when management moved out of the state’s hands.
A central figure in that period was Mahmoud Hojjati, who spent nearly 12 years as minister and helped grow Jihad Nasr by steering projects to it and by creating the conditions for its separation from government.
Nasser Karami, a climatologist and pioneer of environmental journalism in Iran, described Hojjati as a difficult figure to hold to account.
“Hojjati was a deeply security-oriented figure. It was not easy to write about him or even speak with him,” he told Iran International.
Calling him a “mysterious figure,” Karami added: “His connections were primarily with the Supreme Leader’s Office [Ali Khamenei], and he belonged to a generation still seeking to revive the early ideals of the revolution.”
A key legal mechanism was embedded in Jihad Nasr’s charter: Article 27, approved during Hojjati’s first ministerial term, which transferred assets and properties of the Ministry of Jihad for Construction and its affiliated bodies that were under Jihad Nasr’s control to the institution via a lease-to-own arrangement.
Over the years, the group’s leadership has repeatedly drawn from senior state circles – former governors and provincial governors, managers linked to the Supreme Leader’s economic apparatus, and former MPs from influential parliamentary committees.
Economist Siamak Javadi of the University of Texas argued that the group’s growth illustrates the blurred boundary between state and private power in Iran.
“The emergence of Jihad Nasr stems from the leftist outlook of the founders of the Islamic Republic, who initially sought to run the entire economy in a centralized manner, but over time realized this was not feasible,” he said.
He added: “Privatization in Iran is in no way comparable to privatization in free-market countries. In the case of Jihad Nasr, the Islamic Republic has used privatization to create new entities for the distribution of rents.”
In 1985, the Mostazafan Foundation established three entities – Jihad Nasr, Jihad Esteghlal and Development Jihad – and handed their management to engineering battalions from the eight-year Iran-Iraq war.
In 1997, control of the network was transferred to the Ministry of Jihad for Construction – a government body later dissolved in 2000 and merged into the Ministry of Agriculture – after which Jihad Nasr’s activities expanded until roughly a decade ago, when management moved out of the state’s hands.
A central figure in that period was Mahmoud Hojjati, who spent nearly 12 years as minister and helped grow Jihad Nasr by steering projects to it and by creating the conditions for its separation from government.
Nasser Karami, a climatologist and pioneer of environmental journalism in Iran, described Hojjati as a difficult figure to hold to account.
“Hojjati was a deeply security-oriented figure. It was not easy to write about him or even speak with him,” he told Iran International.
Calling him a “mysterious figure,” Karami added: “His connections were primarily with the Supreme Leader’s Office [Ali Khamenei], and he belonged to a generation still seeking to revive the early ideals of the revolution.”
A key legal mechanism was embedded in Jihad Nasr’s charter: Article 27, approved during Hojjati’s first ministerial term, which transferred assets and properties of the Ministry of Jihad for Construction and its affiliated bodies that were under Jihad Nasr’s control to the institution via a lease-to-own arrangement.
Over the years, the group’s leadership has repeatedly drawn from senior state circles – former governors and provincial governors, managers linked to the Supreme Leader’s economic apparatus, and former MPs from influential parliamentary committees.
Economist Siamak Javadi of the University of Texas argued that the group’s growth illustrates the blurred boundary between state and private power in Iran.
“The emergence of Jihad Nasr stems from the leftist outlook of the founders of the Islamic Republic, who initially sought to run the entire economy in a centralized manner, but over time realized this was not feasible,” he said.
And he added: “Privatization in Iran is in no way comparable to privatization in free-market countries. In the case of Jihad Nasr, the Islamic Republic has used privatization to create new entities for the distribution of rents.”
Growth across administrations: From sate patronage to a 170-company network
Iran International has identified at least 170 companies linked to the Jihad Nasr group – entities either founded by the conglomerate or later acquired or taken over by it.
The pace of expansion accelerated during President Mohammad Khatami’s second term. Between 2001 and 2006, Jihad Nasr established seven new companies in just four years, firms that have since grown into major contractors with substantial project portfolios.
One example is Rad Nirou Nasr Industrial Projects, which in June 2025 signed a contract with the Central Iranian Oil Fields Company to supply and build wellhead facilities and a transmission pipeline in the Dehloran region in western province of Ilam.
Rad Nirou Nasr is also among Iran’s main producers and suppliers of water and electricity meters.
By the start of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency in 2005, the number of Jihad Nasr–affiliated companies had reached 59. Over his eight-year term, another 37 companies were added, bringing the total to 96. During this period, the group expanded not only in size but also in the range of sectors in which it operated.
The fastest phase of corporate growth came under President Hassan Rouhani. Between 2013 and 2021, as Hojjati returned to government as agriculture minister, the registration of new companies linked to Jihad Nasr reached a record level. Over those eight years, 45 new companies were created.
Among them was Talashgaran Eghtesad Paydar (Sustainable Economy Activists), a holding company that went on to acquire all Jihad Nasr affiliates and place them under a single corporate umbrella.
Since 2021, a further 26 companies have been added to the network. The most recent is Arya Sanjesh Mahan, a subsidiary of Rad Nirou Nasr that manufactures smart water meters.
Iran International has identified at least 170 companies linked to the Jihad Nasr group – entities either founded by the conglomerate or later acquired or taken over by it.
The pace of expansion accelerated during President Mohammad Khatami’s second term. Between 2001 and 2006, Jihad Nasr established seven new companies in just four years, firms that have since grown into major contractors with substantial project portfolios.
One example is Rad Nirou Nasr Industrial Projects, which in June 2025 signed a contract with the Central Iranian Oil Fields Company to supply and build wellhead facilities and a transmission pipeline in the Dehloran region in western province of Ilam.
Rad Nirou Nasr is also among Iran’s main producers and suppliers of water and electricity meters.
By the start of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency in 2005, the number of Jihad Nasr–affiliated companies had reached 59. Over his eight-year term, another 37 companies were added, bringing the total to 96. During this period, the group expanded not only in size but also in the range of sectors in which it operated.
The fastest phase of corporate growth came under President Hassan Rouhani. Between 2013 and 2021, as Hojjati returned to government as agriculture minister, the registration of new companies linked to Jihad Nasr reached a record level. Over those eight years, 45 new companies were created.
Among them was Talashgaran Eghtesad Paydar (Sustainable Economy Activists), a holding company that went on to acquire all Jihad Nasr affiliates and place them under a single corporate umbrella.
Since 2021, a further 26 companies have been added to the network. The most recent is Arya Sanjesh Mahan, a subsidiary of Rad Nirou Nasr that manufactures smart water meters.
From water transfer and mass housing projects to nuclear-linked infrastructure
Jihad Nasr’s footprint is visible across a wide spectrum of state-linked construction and industrial work. Companies affiliated with the group served as contractors for many of Iran’s large-scale Mehr Housing scheme developments nationwide, and the construction of residential units and urban planning projects in the new city of Hashtgerd was also awarded to Jihad Nasr firms.
Iran International examined nearly 1,500 domestic and international projects carried out by 37 companies out of the 170 firms linked to the Jihad Nasr network.
Some are mega-projects – each made up of dozens of sub-projects – and a number are described as security-related. The portfolio includes construction work at the Bushehr nuclear power plant, access roads to the Fordow nuclear site, access routes to the Saghand uranium mine, the construction of crisis management headquarters, and other sensitive state facilities, including judiciary buildings, Mobile Communications Company of Iran (MCI) data infrastructure, and the Statistical Center of Iran.
Jihad Nasr companies have also held layered roles on major transport projects. In the Sirjan–Bandar Abbas freeway project, Kerman Jihad Nasr is both a supplier and beneficiary of the project and also its contractor.
In urban transit, many city-rail projects in Tehran and other cities have been awarded to Jihad Nasr subsidiaries, which work across the pipeline – from tunneling and track-laying to station construction.
In Tehran, notable examples include the Valiasr and Imam Hossein subway projects.
Some parts of the network have also intersected with military-linked manufacturing. Tieco, a Jihad Nasr subsidiary, was among the targets of Israeli attacks in November 2024.
The Shamsabad factory in Tehran, owned by Mohandesi Noavaran Taksaz Sanat (Tieco), was struck; at the time, reports said that the facility played a role in producing parts used for drones and was involved in manufacturing military equipment.
Alongside large infrastructure contracts, the group’s expansion has also included ventures that fuse business with political symbolism.
In October 2019, months before the death of Gerard's Quds commander Qassem Soleimani, Jihad Nasr Kerman established Bahar Hooni Processing and Packaging Industries in a village in Rabor County, Kerman Province, and Soleimani’s birthplace.
Soleimani was later photographed visiting the facility alongside Abbas Hassanzadeh Morouei, chief executive of Kerman Jihad Nasr Holding.
The plant processes medicinal herbs; among its products is the “Qassem” eau de parfum, made from plants grown in the village and marketed under Soleimani’s name and image, with a 30-milliliter bottle sold at the Bahar Hooni store for around 10 million rials, about $8 at today rates.
A central part of Jihad Nasr’s project portfolio has been water and soil – including, in some cases, end-to-end roles spanning water-transfer systems, dam construction, pumping stations, and treatment plants.
Several water-transfer and land-reclamation initiatives are treated as core national projects; the most significant is the Khuzestan and Ilam land-reclamation project, which itself contains dozens of sub-projects.
The policy environment around these projects has been politically charged. A “Wheat Self-Sufficiency Celebration” was held in December 2016, when Hojjati was serving his second term as minister.
Many environmental experts argue that insisting on self-sufficiency in agricultural products and expanding cultivated land have been among the main drivers of Iran’s water crisis.
Environmental journalist Karami argues that Jihad Nasr’s projects – particularly in water and soil – fit within the Islamic Republic’s overarching ideological priorities.
Pointing out that using the term “mafia” in such narratives can serve to “exonerate” the Islamic Republic from responsibility for the country’s environmental disaster, he added: “Nevertheless, when it came to dividing up these benefits, conservative and reformist political groups defined specific spheres for themselves.”
Karami described that division this way: “Traditionally, areas such as trade were in the hands of the Islamic Republic’s right-wing faction, while in specialized fields like dams and power plants, the left – or so-called reformists – were usually present.”
Jihad Nasr’s footprint is visible across a wide spectrum of state-linked construction and industrial work. Companies affiliated with the group served as contractors for many of Iran’s large-scale Mehr Housing scheme developments nationwide, and the construction of residential units and urban planning projects in the new city of Hashtgerd was also awarded to Jihad Nasr firms.
Iran International examined nearly 1,500 domestic and international projects carried out by 37 companies out of the 170 firms linked to the Jihad Nasr network.
Some are mega-projects – each made up of dozens of sub-projects – and a number are described as security-related. The portfolio includes construction work at the Bushehr nuclear power plant, access roads to the Fordow nuclear site, access routes to the Saghand uranium mine, the construction of crisis management headquarters, and other sensitive state facilities, including judiciary buildings, Mobile Communications Company of Iran (MCI) data infrastructure, and the Statistical Center of Iran.
Jihad Nasr companies have also held layered roles on major transport projects. In the Sirjan–Bandar Abbas freeway project, Kerman Jihad Nasr is both a supplier and beneficiary of the project and also its contractor.
In urban transit, many city-rail projects in Tehran and other cities have been awarded to Jihad Nasr subsidiaries, which work across the pipeline – from tunneling and track-laying to station construction.
In Tehran, notable examples include the Valiasr and Imam Hossein subway projects.
Some parts of the network have also intersected with military-linked manufacturing. Tieco, a Jihad Nasr subsidiary, was among the targets of Israeli attacks in November 2024.
The Shamsabad factory in Tehran, owned by Mohandesi Noavaran Taksaz Sanat (Tieco), was struck; at the time, reports said that the facility played a role in producing parts used for drones and was involved in manufacturing military equipment.
Alongside large infrastructure contracts, the group’s expansion has also included ventures that fuse business with political symbolism.
In October 2019, months before the death of Gerard's Quds commander Qassem Soleimani, Jihad Nasr Kerman established Bahar Hooni Processing and Packaging Industries in a village in Rabor County, Kerman Province, and Soleimani’s birthplace.
Soleimani was later photographed visiting the facility alongside Abbas Hassanzadeh Morouei, chief executive of Kerman Jihad Nasr Holding.
The plant processes medicinal herbs; among its products is the “Qassem” eau de parfum, made from plants grown in the village and marketed under Soleimani’s name and image, with a 30-milliliter bottle sold at the Bahar Hooni store for around 10 million rials, about $8 at today rates.
A central part of Jihad Nasr’s project portfolio has been water and soil – including, in some cases, end-to-end roles spanning water-transfer systems, dam construction, pumping stations, and treatment plants.
Several water-transfer and land-reclamation initiatives are treated as core national projects; the most significant is the Khuzestan and Ilam land-reclamation project, which itself contains dozens of sub-projects.
The policy environment around these projects has been politically charged. A “Wheat Self-Sufficiency Celebration” was held in December 2016, when Hojjati was serving his second term as minister.
Many environmental experts argue that insisting on self-sufficiency in agricultural products and expanding cultivated land have been among the main drivers of Iran’s water crisis.
Environmental journalist Karami argues that Jihad Nasr’s projects – particularly in water and soil – fit within the Islamic Republic’s overarching ideological priorities.
Pointing out that using the term “mafia” in such narratives can serve to “exonerate” the Islamic Republic from responsibility for the country’s environmental disaster, he added: “Nevertheless, when it came to dividing up these benefits, conservative and reformist political groups defined specific spheres for themselves.”
Karami described that division this way: “Traditionally, areas such as trade were in the hands of the Islamic Republic’s right-wing faction, while in specialized fields like dams and power plants, the left – or so-called reformists – were usually present.”
Financing power: From layered contracting to self-reinforcing projects
Jihad Nasr structured project financing through a layered contracting model, in which subsidiaries and affiliates carved out new sub-projects from state mega-projects – such as the Khuzestan plains restoration, which alone contains hundreds of sub-projects.
Tieco, one of its subsidiaries, built production lines at seven major sugar factories (Khomeini, Amir Kabir, Debal Khozaei, Mirza Kouchak Khan, Salman Farsi, Farabi, Dehkhoda), part of a wider network that placed much of Iran’s sugar production chain in the group’s orbit.
In water infrastructure, the pattern is similar: Jihad Nasr Khorasan serves as contractor for the Khorasan 3 dam and power plant, while an affiliate was awarded the project complex, a structure seen in other dam developments.
On the supply side, Jihad Zamzam Plastic Industries – with factories in Ahvaz, Iranshahr, Zanjan, Sanandaj, and Mashhad – is a main supplier of pipes for water transmission, water and gas distribution, and sewage systems, feeding not only Jihad Nasr-linked irrigation, drainage, and water-transfer work but also projects associated with the IRGC’s Khatam al-Anbiya, which have used pipes from the same manufacturer.
The Hajizadeh nexus: From water transfer to missile tunnels
Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters is one of the institutions most frequently associated with what critics in Iran call the country’s “water mafia.” But its reach extends far beyond the water sector.
Over the years, it has come to be known as a contractor active across almost every major field of construction and infrastructure. The headquarters was established in 1989, at the start of Ali Khamenei’s leadership.
The beginning of Khamenei’s tenure as supreme leader, alongside Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani’s presidency, coincided with two important developments for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
One was the creation of Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters. The other was the establishment of the IRGC’s Self-Sufficiency Jihad, which became a key institutional foundation for the development and expansion of the Islamic Republic’s missile program.
Khatam al-Anbiya’s role, however, was more layered than that of a conventional contractor. Working closely with Jihad Nasr and other firms, it partnered in major infrastructure projects. Amir Ali Hajizadeh, the former commander of the IRGC Aerospace Force and a central figure in the development of Iran’s missile program, was also placed in charge of major water-transfer and metro projects.
The overlap was not accidental. The IRGC has built many of its missile storage facilities inside tunnels – installations it calls “missile cities.” Expanding those facilities requires the same tunneling capacity needed for metro construction and large-scale water-transfer schemes.
Hajizadeh oversaw the Qomroud and Garmasiri water-transfer projects. Studies and subprojects related to Qomroud were carried out by Jihad Nasr subsidiaries, including Jamab.
The water-transfer component of the Garmasiri project was also managed by Hajizadeh. Parts of that project were handed to Jihad Nasr, whose subsidiaries – including Payand Ab Kousha and Jihad Nasr Zamzam – were involved in its implementation.
Hajizadeh also oversaw a major part of the expansion of the Tehran metro during the 13 years it operated under the supervision of Mohsen Hashemi, the eldest son of former president Hashemi Rafsanjani who was the chairman of the City Council of Tehran from 2017 to 2021.
During that same period, he imported giant tunnel-boring machines, or TBMs, ostensibly for the excavation of Tehran metro tunnels, and sent a number of technicians abroad for training in how to operate them.
In April 2016, shortly after internal resolutions to transfer Nasr-group companies to “veterans” and employees, a new holding company – Talashgaran Eghtesad Paydar – was established and later absorbed nearly all Jihad Nasr companies and assets, recasting the network in a non-governmental form while registering it as a private joint-stock company.
Jihad Nasr structured project financing through a layered contracting model, in which subsidiaries and affiliates carved out new sub-projects from state mega-projects – such as the Khuzestan plains restoration, which alone contains hundreds of sub-projects.
Tieco, one of its subsidiaries, built production lines at seven major sugar factories (Khomeini, Amir Kabir, Debal Khozaei, Mirza Kouchak Khan, Salman Farsi, Farabi, Dehkhoda), part of a wider network that placed much of Iran’s sugar production chain in the group’s orbit.
In water infrastructure, the pattern is similar: Jihad Nasr Khorasan serves as contractor for the Khorasan 3 dam and power plant, while an affiliate was awarded the project complex, a structure seen in other dam developments.
On the supply side, Jihad Zamzam Plastic Industries – with factories in Ahvaz, Iranshahr, Zanjan, Sanandaj, and Mashhad – is a main supplier of pipes for water transmission, water and gas distribution, and sewage systems, feeding not only Jihad Nasr-linked irrigation, drainage, and water-transfer work but also projects associated with the IRGC’s Khatam al-Anbiya, which have used pipes from the same manufacturer.
The Hajizadeh nexus: From water transfer to missile tunnels
Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters is one of the institutions most frequently associated with what critics in Iran call the country’s “water mafia.” But its reach extends far beyond the water sector.
Over the years, it has come to be known as a contractor active across almost every major field of construction and infrastructure. The headquarters was established in 1989, at the start of Ali Khamenei’s leadership.
The beginning of Khamenei’s tenure as supreme leader, alongside Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani’s presidency, coincided with two important developments for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
One was the creation of Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters. The other was the establishment of the IRGC’s Self-Sufficiency Jihad, which became a key institutional foundation for the development and expansion of the Islamic Republic’s missile program.
Khatam al-Anbiya’s role, however, was more layered than that of a conventional contractor. Working closely with Jihad Nasr and other firms, it partnered in major infrastructure projects. Amir Ali Hajizadeh, the former commander of the IRGC Aerospace Force and a central figure in the development of Iran’s missile program, was also placed in charge of major water-transfer and metro projects.
The overlap was not accidental. The IRGC has built many of its missile storage facilities inside tunnels – installations it calls “missile cities.” Expanding those facilities requires the same tunneling capacity needed for metro construction and large-scale water-transfer schemes.
Hajizadeh oversaw the Qomroud and Garmasiri water-transfer projects. Studies and subprojects related to Qomroud were carried out by Jihad Nasr subsidiaries, including Jamab.
The water-transfer component of the Garmasiri project was also managed by Hajizadeh. Parts of that project were handed to Jihad Nasr, whose subsidiaries – including Payand Ab Kousha and Jihad Nasr Zamzam – were involved in its implementation.
Hajizadeh also oversaw a major part of the expansion of the Tehran metro during the 13 years it operated under the supervision of Mohsen Hashemi, the eldest son of former president Hashemi Rafsanjani who was the chairman of the City Council of Tehran from 2017 to 2021.
During that same period, he imported giant tunnel-boring machines, or TBMs, ostensibly for the excavation of Tehran metro tunnels, and sent a number of technicians abroad for training in how to operate them.
In April 2016, shortly after internal resolutions to transfer Nasr-group companies to “veterans” and employees, a new holding company – Talashgaran Eghtesad Paydar – was established and later absorbed nearly all Jihad Nasr companies and assets, recasting the network in a non-governmental form while registering it as a private joint-stock company.
Talashgaran markets itself online as a “private entity free from cumbersome government administrative constraints,” run by “esteemed war commanders,” and says it controls 116 subsidiaries, 5,534 heavy and semi-heavy machines, and 15,219 employees, with additional connected firms linked through intermediaries, managers, or shareholders.
Talashgaran’s leadership draws from a familiar pool: former provincial governors, wartime engineering and security figures, managers tied to Khamenei-linked economic institutions, and senior state officials, including board members and inspectors with roles across ministries, parliament, and other state bodies such as the Expediency Discernment Council.
Parliamentary efforts to investigate the network have repeatedly stalled, including a withdrawn probe in 2015 and a renewed pledge in June 2025 that has yet to produce a public update.
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